

DD/A Registry  
File Security 5

The Director

Sir:

In response to your question concerning possible disadvantages connected with consolidated and standardized polygraph training, the Office of Security has added one paragraph on "disadvantages" in paragraph 12. Paragraph 3.(B) has also been added to give added weight to the need for in-house training.

/s/ JOHN N. McMAHON

John N. McMahon  
Acting DD/A  
28 AUG 1974


ATEO-DD/A: [ ] kmg (26 Aug 74)

Distribution:

Orig Blue Note - Adse w/Orig of Att (DDM&S 74-3025) *by hand*  
~~1~~ - DD/A Subject w/cy of Att  
1 - DD/A Chrono

DDM&S 74-3025: Memo dtd 24 Jul 74 to DCI via DDM&S, DDS&T, D/MS, GC, LC fr D/Sec, subj:  
Release of Material on the Agency's Use of Polygraph to the House Committee on Government Operations

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Mr. <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;"> </span>	9/5	<i>[Signature]</i>		
2	<i>Mr McMahon</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>		
3	<i>Legation</i>				
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
<b>Remarks:</b> <i>1-2 Info before returning it to D/Os. This paper was first drafted in late 1973, and was approved by the DCI as of 9/4/74. It is of considerable interest to <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 10px;"> </span> OLC.</i>					
Att: DD/M&S 74-3025					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 26 August 1974
TO: Mr. McMahon		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  Recommend your signature on the attached blue note to the DCI.   LJD		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100130027-  
 22 AUG 1974

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1		8/22	GFD
2	D/S	26	CSF
3	4E 60 Hqs		
4			
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Att: DDM&S 74-3025			

**Remarks:**

Please prepare response  
 to  note.

*Suspense: Aug. 27*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Acting Executive Officer to the DD/A	
7D 26 Hqs	22 AUG 74
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET

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# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1		8/22	GFDX
2	D/5		
3	4E 60 Hqs		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Att: DDM&S 74-3025

## Remarks:

Please prepare response

to [redacted] note.

Suspense: Aug. 27

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Acting Executive Officer to the DD/A

7D 26 Hqs.

22 Aug 74

UNCLASSIFIED

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FORM NO. 1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

DDO-DD/A: [redacted] (22 Aug 74)

## Distribution:

Orig RS - D/Sec w/Orig of Att

1-2 DDA Subject w/subj cy of Att

DDM&S 74-3025: Memo dtd 24 Jul 74 to DCI via DDM&S, DDS&T, D/MS, GC, LC fr D/Sec, subj: Release of Material on the Agency's Use of Polygraph to the House Committee on Government Operations

DCI/DDCI

DDA #

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S	✓		16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Are there not also  
some disadvantages  
to para 12 we  
should point out?

DCI/DDCI

8/21/74

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DC 74-1582

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Release of Material on the Agency's Use of Polygraph to the House Committee on Government Operations

FROM:

Director of Security  
4E-60 Hqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

24 JUL 1974

STA

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

STA

1. DD/S&T  
6E-60

2. D/MS  
1D-4061

3. General Counsel  
7D-01

4. Legislative Counsel  
7D-43

5. DD/M&S  
7D-26

6. ~~DDO~~  
~~DCI~~

7. ~~DD/M&S~~

8. ~~D/Sec~~  
~~4E-60~~

9. A/DDO

10. DDCI

11. DCI

12. DD/A

13. D/Sec

14.

15.

25 JUL 1974

26 JUL 1974

7/26/74  
7/30/74

7/29/74  
7/31/74

8 AUG 1974

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

*Call for hand carry*

From 4 to 5 and 6:  
Regarding question #11 concerning polygraphs of the DCI and DDCI, the Committee has been advised that both the DCI and DDCI had been polygraphed during prior employment in intelligence related activities.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
GLC

INFO

Approved

CS REGISTRY

0540358

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Mr. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 15px;"></span>	8/8	L		
2	Mr. McMahon	8/8	7		
3	Mr. Blake	8/8	gfbx		
4					
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

## Remarks:

1-2 Recommend DD/MOS concurrence  
but Mr Blake might be interested in the  
George Cary info that General Walters  
was once polygraphed.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE



1270  
74-3021

24 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management  
and Services  
Deputy Director for Science  
and Technology  
Director of Medical Services  
General Counsel  
Legislative Counsel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Release of Material on the Agency's  
Use of Polygraph to the House  
Committee on Government Operations

1. Action Requested: It is requested that you approve the attached unclassified responses to questions asked of the Agency following the 5 June 1974 testimony on polygraph before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, House Government Operations Committee.

2. Basic Data:

a. On 5 June 1974 Mr. Harold L. Brownman, Deputy Director for Management and Services, testified before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee on the use of polygraph within CIA. The Agency received follow-up questions during the month of July.

b. We have drafted the attached material for your consideration and propose its use as the required response.

0540358

3. Staff Position: We believe this material is responsive to the Committee's request. It was coordinated with the Director of Medical Services and the Office of Research and Development, DD/S&T.

4. Recommendation: In view of the above, it is recommended that you approve the use of the attached material as the Agency's response to the July questions of the Subcommittee.



Charles W. Kane  
Director of Security

STA

Att

**SUBJECT: Release of Material on the Agency's  
Use of Polygraph to the House  
Committee on Government Operations**

**CONCURRENCES:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Carl E. Duckett**  
**Deputy Director**  
**for**  
**Science and Technology**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**SIGNED**  
**JOHN R. TIETJEN M.D.**  
**John R. Tietjen**  
**Director of Medical Services**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**26 JUL 1974**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**s/ John S. Warner**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**30 JUL 1974**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**John S. Warner**  
**General Counsel**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**1/2 George L. Cary, Jr.**  
**George L. Cary, Jr.**  
**Legislative Counsel**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**8/8/74**  
**Date**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**HAROLD L. BROWMAN**  
**Deputy Director**  
**for**  
**Management and Services**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**8 AUG 1974**

\_\_\_\_\_  
**Date**

**SUBJECT: Release of Material on the Agency's  
Use of Polygraph to the House  
Committee on Government Operations**

**APPROVED:** *S/ W. E. Colby* 4 SEP 1974

**DISAPPROVED:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Distribution:**

Orig - Return to OS via DD/M&S

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - DD/S&T

1 - D/MS

1 - GC

1 - LC

2 - DD/M&S *Encl. Subject*

TAB

QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. What is the nature of research by CIA into the subject of polygraph testing and have inquiries been made to DOD to ensure that there is no duplication of that department's research effort?
2. What are the results of the research already performed, and what research is currently under way or planned for early performance?
3. Are there any peculiar training requirements for CIA polygraph examiners that require an in-house training program, separate from those of the FBI or the Army?
4. Are individuals who undergo polygraph tests told of the results of those tests and of the conclusions of the examiner?
5. Why is the individual undergoing the polygraph test told, only if he inquires, whether or not the examination is being monitored or recorded?
6. In fiscal year 1974 has information from or the results of CIA-administered polygraph tests been made known to other Federal agencies or offices in the Executive Branch? Under what circumstances?
7. Is it a requirement, prior to an individual being given a polygraph test, that he be examined by a physician and by a psychiatrist or psychologist? Are such examinations more than an interview?
8. Would you recommend such prerequisite examinations be adopted Government-wide, by all agencies administering polygraph tests?
9. To what extent are full and free discussions by CIA personnel with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board inhibited by the fact that neither the members of that board nor its Executive Secretary nor any of the Board's employees must take and pass a polygraph test as a condition of appointment or employment?

Questions for the CIA

2

10. Why is it necessary for CIA to use polygraphs for pre-employment screening when the State and Defense Departments and the FBI do not believe it is necessary for their many sensitive jobs?
11. The top two officials of CIA are not required to undergo polygraph testing yet all other CIA officials and employees are. What possible justification could there be for testing all the Indians but not the two biggest Chiefs?
12. What are your views on the advantages that could accrue if responsibility for polygraph examiner training were to be assigned to one agency, consolidated at one or two locations, and standardized as to length, course content, and examining techniques?

TAB



1. The CIA's polygraph research effort was comprised of an internal data collection program and an external experimental program. The internal program's goals were: (a) to develop a technology to objectively measure and classify the polygraph signals and (b) to assess the utility, reliability and validity of the polygraph to the Agency in its security practices for employment screening. The external program examined: (a) new sensors; (b) alternate modes of question presentation and/or subject response; and (c) various analytic techniques for chart interpretation. The external studies also addressed the issues of reliability and validity.

The external research effort was coordinated with DOD through attendance at meetings of the Joint Services Group established by the DOD to monitor research. Though the data base of the internal research program was not shared with the DOD members, they were kept apprised of technical developments and problems.

STA

2.


the studies. By and large, the studies demonstrated that: (a) there is a rational and scientific basis for polygraph; (b) the polygraph is an effective detector of stress (though clearly not infallible); and (c) while several new sensors showed promise, none was sufficiently so to warrant changes.

STA

The current research effort will examine techniques to identify attempted countermeasures. This program was only recently undertaken and there are no results thus far.

3. This question must be answered in three parts.

- (A) There are no peculiar training requirements that require an in-house training program separate from those of the FBI or the Army when training is considered to be limited to familiarization with the mechanical aspects of instrumentation, instrument operation and chart interpretation.
- (B) For our needs, the training of an individual must be integrated into a closely supervised, carefully progressive on-the-job program before a determination can be made that he is qualified. We can only do this in-house.
- (C) There are also peculiar training requirements which indicate the advisability of a CIA in-house training program when the full scope of application of the polygraph program in CIA is considered. . CIA



STA

3. This question must be answered in two parts.
- (A) There are no peculiar training requirements that require an in-house training program separate from those of the FBI or the Army when training is considered to be limited to familiarization with the mechanical aspects of instrumentation, instrument operation and chart interpretation.
  - (B) There are peculiar training requirements which indicate the advisability of a CIA in-house training program when the full scope of application of the polygraph program in CIA is considered. CIA

STA

4. No.
5. The polygraph interview situation itself serves as a disturbing stimulus to many people and the additional apprehension which may accompany the knowledge that they are being recorded or monitored is counter productive to the efforts of the polygraph examiner to put the individual at ease. For this reason only, the information is not volunteered by the polygraph examiner to each individual. The individual is told truthfully whether or not the interview is being monitored or recorded whenever the question is asked.

Following discussions with the Subcommittee on this issue, the Agency has initiated a procedure whereby each applicant will be informed in writing prior to polygraph interview that the polygraph test may be monitored and recorded for purposes of accuracy. We plan on including a statement to this effect in the polygraph agreement which is provided to each applicant before the test. A copy of the modified polygraph agreement is attached. This proposal has now been presented to our Office of General Counsel for coordination.

6. CIA releases information derived from polygraph tests only on request of federal employers. In fiscal year 1974, CIA disseminated information resulting from CIA polygraph tests in 7 cases. In each case, the individual involved was employed or assigned in a civilian or military capacity to a federal department or agency involved in sensitive intelligence affairs or requiring sensitive information in the national interest. Authorization to release this information was obtained in each case from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Subsequent to the

authorization, information was passed verbally through established security channels for investigative lead processing only. The receiving department or agency was then to conduct its own independent investigation to substantiate the lead provided by CIA.

7. This question must be answered in two parts.
  - (A) The procedure followed by CIA in processing an applicant for employment has been structured so that physical examinations and psychiatric screenings are performed prior to the polygraph interview.
  - (B) The examinations are more than interviews. The examinations are good physical examinations which assist in the determination whether or not the applicant is physically fit for that category of duty for which he is contemplated. Applicants are also psychiatrically screened. Where a mental problem is indicated, a full-fledged evaluation is made.
8. Although the CIA orders its processing so that all candidates for employment are first given medical examinations and screened psychiatrically and believes this is a sound procedure, the CIA refrains from commenting on procedures of other government agencies in administering polygraph tests and from recommending a course of action to be adopted government wide.
9. Full and free discussions by CIA personnel with the PFIAB are not in any way inhibited by the fact that associated personnel are not polygraphed as a condition of employment or appointment.
10. The CIA respectfully refrains from comment on the applicant processing procedures of the Department of State,

the Defense Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The CIA has found the use of the polygraph to be a positive assistance in employment screening and personnel investigation. The loss of the polygraph program would have a negative and undesirable effect on the continued secure operations of the Agency.

11. There are only two positions in CIA filled by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. These appointees are subject to whatever screening procedures may be prescribed by the President, or suggested by Congress and approved by the President. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate that CIA require additional screening procedures, such as the polygraph test, for these appointees.
12. There are some advantages that could accrue if responsibility for polygraph examiner training were to be consolidated and standardized. Among these are:

Selection of best training personnel available.

Establishment of criteria for examiner qualifications.

A better overview of government's polygraph requirements and applications.

A potential for contact with commercial efforts on polygraph research, developments and application.

A pooling of experience.

A focal point for government sponsored polygraph research, development and application.

A possible financial advantage.

As to disadvantages:

A consolidated school would, of necessity, be limited to presenting a general curriculum of poly-graph training not designed to accommodate special requirements unique to a specific government agency. As explained in our response to Question 3, a general curriculum divorced from our particular needs and separated from our on-the-job capabilities would be inefficient and time-wasting.

TAB





## POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT

I, \_\_\_\_\_, an applicant for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Polygraph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy. I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

The above was read and signed in my presence this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature



## POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT

I, \_\_\_\_\_, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Polygraph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy. I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

The above was read and signed in my presence this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature